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ARTICLESThe Significance of a Life’s Shape*
Dale Dorsey
The shape of a life hypothesis holds, very roughly, that lives are better when they have
an upward, rather than downward, slope in terms of momentary well-being. This
hypothesis is plausible and has been thought to cause problems for traditional
principles of prudential value/rationality. In this article, I conduct an inquiry into
the shape of a life hypothesis that addresses two crucial questions. The first ques-
tion is: what is the most plausible underlying explanation of the significance of a
life’s shape? The second question is: given its most plausible explanation, what does
the shape of a life hypothesis teach us about the nature of prudential value?In a classic episode of the television drama Mad Men, a young, and ap-
parently brilliant, advertising executive named Guy MacKendrick is ap-
pointed head of Sterling Cooper ðthe agency around which the show
revolvesÞ. The show portrays this as a moment of great triumph for Mac-
Kendrick. Later in the episode, however, a drunk member of the admin-
istrative staff accidentally destroys Guy’s foot in a horrific accident. His ca-
reer is, apparently, over ðat least according to his superiorsÞ. The lesson is
summed up by Joan Holloway like this: “That’s life. One minute you’re on
top of the world, the next minute some secretary’s running you over with a
lawn mower.”
Reflecting on MacKendrick’s case, one is tempted not just to say that
his accident is a misfortune, but that this misfortune is magnified by the
fact that it was preceded by a relative high: MacKendrick’s life, at least in
the short period about which we know, takes a manifest downward slope.
But imagine a contrast case: imagine, for instance, that MacKendrick had* I’d like to thank Ben Bradley, Chris Heathwood, Eden Lin, Connie Rosati, Michael
Smith, Valerie Tiberius, and audiences at Princeton University, Florida State University,
and Claremont McKenna College for helpful feedback.
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terrible difficulty in early childhood, suffering disease and disability, fi-
nally allowing his talent to carry him to the top of a prestigious ad firm
later in life. While this upward-sloping life may have just as much success
and misfortune as its mirror image, we would certainly regard it as pref-
erable, other things equal.
This phenomenon has played a major role in the literature on well-
being. The shape of a life hypothesis holds, very roughly, that lives are better
when they have an upward, rather than downward, slope in terms of
momentary well-being. The shape of a life hypothesis is plausible in its
own right, so plausible that many have taken it as dispositive evidence
against popular axiological principles. This includes the principle of in-
tralife aggregation ðaccording to which the welfare level of an individual’s
whole life is an aggregate of momentary welfareÞ and the principle of
temporal neutrality ðaccording to which the temporal location of a good
moment in and of itself is irrelevant to its contribution to the value of a
lifeÞ. In this article, I conduct an inquiry into the shape of a life hypothesis
that addresses two crucial questions. The first question is: what is the most
plausible underlying explanation of the significance of a life’s shape? The
second question is: given its most plausible explanation, does the shape of
a life hypothesis threaten intralife aggregation or the principle of tem-
poral neutrality?
The plan of the article is as follows. In Section I, I motivate the shape
of a life hypothesis, and in Section II, I discuss the lessons typically drawn
from it. In Sections III–V, I outline five potential explanations of the wel-
fare value of a life’s shape and critically examine them. In Sections VI–VII,
I argue that the best explanation need not of itself threaten the principles
of temporal neutrality or intralife aggregation. Whether we should accept
or reject such principles is independent, or so I claim, of our commitment
to the significance of a life’s shape. In Section VIII, I conclude by briefly
suggesting what I take to be the genuine lesson of our reflection on lives
like MacKendrick’s.
I. THE SHAPE OF A LIFE
To see the issue I’m interested in discussing, contrastll useO. J. Simpson. O. J. Simpson was a celebrated college and profes-
sional football running back, film actor and producer, and sports
commentator. In his mid-forties, in the midst of his success, Simpson
was put on trial for murder. And though he was acquitted after a
lengthy and highly publicized trial, many were convinced of his guilt,
and as a result his reputation had been effectively ruined. Following
his acquittal, he was held civilly liable for wrongful death in the same
event and was later convicted of burglary in Las Vegas, was sentenced
to thirty-three years in prison, and is currently serving his sentence at
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withll useJ. O. Nospmis. J. O. Nospmis grew up in the midst of gang-related
violence and crime, was suspected at an early age of murder, and was
eventually sentenced at age twenty-five for a series of armed robber-
ies. Following her stint in prison, Nospmis was released and given an
opportunity to coach basketball at a local club for troubled youth.
Her success at this endeavor, along with her rapport with players and
amazing life turnaround brought her to the attention of high schools,
later universities. She retired after having coached her team to back-
to-back NCAA Final Four appearances, and spent her remaining years
as a popular and trusted broadcaster, offering insightful color com-
mentary on professional and college basketball.As we all know, O. J. Simpson experienced one of the most dramatic down-
falls in American public life. Nospmis, though fictional, displays just as
dramatic an improvement. In comparing Nospmis with Simpson, we may
be tempted to ask: who had the better life? And somemay be tempted, as I
am, to say: Nospmis! But even if the matter is not quite so clear, we can at
least ask ourselves: is there something positive about Nospmis’s life that
Simpson’s lacks? Even if this isn’t enough itself to renderNospmis’s life on
the whole better, there surely is something that Nospmis has that Simpson
doesn’t: Nospmis’s life featured a dramatic upswing; Simpson’s a horrific
downfall. Thus, a consideration of Simpson and Nospmis supports theðSLHÞ Shape of a Life Hypothesis. The temporal sequence of good and
bad times in a life can be a valuable feature of that life as a whole.Two interpretive notes are important here. The first concerns the phrase
“good and bad times.” In ordinary language, we have a tendency to speak
of, for example, “good times” and “bad times” in a life, and so forth. But
what does this mean? Times, after all, are not among the bearers of in-
trinsic value. The quality of my life is determined by the occurrence ðor
lack thereofÞ of events, states of affairs, activities, objects, and so on, that
are themselves intrinsically good for me. Rather, when we talk about good
times, we appear to be talking about times during which we are benefited
ðor, perhaps burdenedÞ by the genuine bearers of intrinsic welfare value,
namely, individual objects, events, or states of affairs. Times possess a form
of what onemight call derivative value—value that derives from the extent
to which an individual is benefited during those times by relevant welfare
goods. Thus, when using the phrase “good times,” I simply refer to times
during which one is net benefited by particular welfare goods, times at
which one has a high level of synchronic welfare. Second: my goal here is
to interpret SLH as ecumenically as possible.With this inmind, I interpret
the phrase “valuable feature” widely, to include any appropriately welfare-
relevant value. By this I mean, simply, value that is explained in part byThis content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
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facts about a person’s welfare. This could include, for example, intrinsic
welfare value. But it needn’t: nothing in SLH guarantees that the value
possessed by the temporal sequence of good and bad times in a life is
intrinsically welfare valuable rather than, say, instrumentally welfare val-
uable.1 While I ultimately argue that such a weak interpretation of the sig-
nificance of a life’s shape fails ðsee Sec. IIIÞ, I don’t wish to rule it out
analytically. ðNote also that I’ve refrained from stating SLH in a way that
would commit it to the claim that an upward trend is the preferred shape.
Though it may be implausible, we would certainly say that any view accord-
ing to which a downward slope is better than an upward accepts the sig-
nificance of a life’s shape. But as it won’t have any bearing on the argu-
ments herein, I’ll concentrate on the more common “upward-is-better”
version.Þ
II. LEARNING FROM SLH
Most theorists who discuss the shape of a life hypothesis do so to draw
a series of lessons. Most importantly, many have held that SLH implies
the denial of standard principles of prudential axiology/rationality.2 For









ll useðILAÞ Intralife Aggregation. The welfare of an extended period of
time ðdiachronic welfareÞ, including the welfare of a whole life,
is determined by an additive function of the welfare of individual
times in that period ðsynchronic welfareÞ.Why might SLH threaten intralife aggregation? The answer appears rel-
atively simple. If the temporal sequence of good and bad times in a life
matters to the quality of that life, it would appear, first, that a determi-
nation of the quality of a whole life, or indeed any extended temporal
period in a life, cannot be a simple summation of the welfare values of
individual times or moments in that life. One might put this in terms of
information. To determine the relative quality of two lives, onemust know
not just how good the individual times in those lives were. One must also
knowwhether the good times preceded the bad, or vice versa. But because
its temporal location is irrelevant to a time’s contribution to the total, a. I use the term “welfare-relevant” value to distinguish other potential sources of
that don’t seem relevant to SLH, e.g., aesthetic value.
. See, for instance, David Velleman, “Well-Being and Time,” inThe Possibility of Practi-
ason ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2000Þ, 56–84; Michael Slote, “Goods and Lives,”
ods and Virtues ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1984Þ, 9–37; Larry Temkin, Rethinking
ood ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2012Þ, chap. 3; Joshua Glasgow, “The Shape of a
and the Value of Loss and Gain,” Philosophical Studies 162 ð2013Þ: 665–82, 667–69;
Brink, “Prospects for Temporal Neutrality,” in Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Time,
raig Callender ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2010Þ, 353–81, 358.
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sum of synchronic welfare will not ðor will not necessarilyÞ be equivalent to
an individual’s lifetime well-being.








ll use There are many factors that seem relevant to the overall goodness
of a life besides merely the sum total of local goodness or badness
that obtains within that life. One such factor might be referred to as
the “pattern,” “direction,” or “shape” of a life. To illustrate this . . .
let’s just divide ½a life into five twenty-year segments and say that as
the life progresses, one’s levels would be 10, 30, 50, 70, and 90,
respectively. In the second scenario, the pattern is reversed. . . .
Specifically, as the life progresses, one’s levels would be at 90, 70, 50,
30, and 10, respectively. On the simple additive approach, the two
lives are equally good, and if, in fact, the second life ended at level
12 instead of level 10, then that life would be better than the first all
things considered.3According to Temkin, an additive approach ðILAÞ must say that the lives
in question are equally good. But insofar as taking the shape of a life seri-
ously seems to require us to declare that the former life is better, or at least
can be better, SLH seems to imply the denial of an additive view. Along
the same lines, Fred Feldman holds that SLH is an attack on his preferred
hedonism simply on the basis that his preferred hedonism accepts ILA.4
In addition to ILA, SLH is also standardly thought to threaten:ðTNÞ Temporal Neutrality. The temporal location of the good ðor
badÞ times in one’s life, of itself, makes no difference to their con-
tribution to a life’s overall value.TN is most canonically stated by Sidgwick: “Hereafter as such is to be re-
garded neither less nor more than Now,”5 but this principle also features
prominently in Rawls: “The intrinsic importance that we assign to different
parts of our life should be the same at everymoment of time.”6 In addition
to its importance as an axiological principle, TN can also be expressed as
a principle of prudential rationality. Once again, Sidgwick: “this equal and
impartial concern for all parts of one’s conscious life is perhaps the most
prominent element in the common notion of the rational—as opposed to. Temkin, Rethinking the Good, 111.
. Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2004Þ,
. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. ðIndianapolis: Hackett, 1981; origi-
published 1907Þ, 381.
. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971Þ,
ev. ed., 369.
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the merely impulsive—pursuit of pleasure.”7 ðI’ll focus on the axiological
statement of temporal neutrality here.Þ However, if SLH is true, temporal
neutrality is threatened. ðIndeed, Temkin treats his attack on ILA as a de
facto attack on Sidgwick’s principle of temporal neutrality.Þ8 After all, if
an upward-sloping life is to be preferred to a downward-sloping life, the
temporal location of good times versus bad times obviously makes a dif-
ference when it comes to how good one’s life is. When it comes to pru-
dential rationality, the rational planner will prefer, other things equal,
that good times arrive when they best contribute to her life’s upward
slope, namely, later rather than earlier.
I’m not going to take a stand on the truth or falsity of TN or ILA here.
Rather, I’m more interested in the relevance of SLH to their truth or falsity.
To begin, note that though the reasoning from SLH to the denial of ILA
and TN is relatively straightforward, it is not neutral between competing ex-
planations of SLH ðespecially given my ecumenical interpretation hereÞ.
Thus to determine the fate of ILA or TN given SLH, we need to know what
sort of value is possessed by a life’s shape and just what explains the value
it has. Indeed, many such explanations have been offered; I’ll explore five
here. One note, however: while each explanation is generally congenial to
distinct theories of well-being, they are not mutually exclusive. These ex-
planations can be mixed and matched; indeed, there is nothing incoher-
ent about the acceptance of all five. In examining the best account of the
significance of a life’s shape, therefore, I will attempt to determine whether
each explanation is sufficient to account for the significance of a life’s
shape, as guided by our considered judgments.
III. EXPLAINING SLH: THE INSTRUMENTAL AND
PRO-ATTITUDE VIEWS
Call the first explanation of SLH the Instrumental View. On this view,
SLH is explained by the fact that living a life with a specific ðsay, down-
wardÞ shape is typically instrumentally disvaluable and that living a life
with a contrary shape ðsay, upwardÞ is typically instrumentally valuable. SLH
is thereby explained: the temporal sequence of good and bad times can be
an instrumentally valuable feature of a life—instrumental, say, to the pain
or unhappiness ðor vice versaÞ someone might feel strictly as a result of a
life with a particular shape.9 Indeed, that the shape of a life might have
such an effect seems easy to believe. We often lament lost goods; the fact
that I lost something that matters to me ðsuch as a job I valued or, e.g.,
my public reputationÞ seems to cause further bad things to happen. And
hence loss seems to be an instrumental bad ðand a gain an instrumental7. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 124n. See also Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of
Altruism ðPrinceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970Þ, 60–61.
8. See Temkin, Rethinking the Good, 96–97, 108–9.
9. Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life, 132–34.
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goodÞ, which would seem to explain the relative value of Simpson’s and
Nospmis’s lives, at least under normal circumstances.
Call the second explanation of SLH the Pro-attitude View. This view
allows that the shape of a life could be intrinsically valuable or disvaluable
ðthus explaining SLHÞ. But its intrinsic value is a result of the fact that
most people will desire or prefer to live lives with upward-sloping shapes.10
For the Pro-attitude View, the significance of a life’s shape is contingent,
namely, on the pro-attitudes we maintain: if Simpson does not possess
any intrinsic preference for an upward rather than downward life, the
shape of his life itself possesses no significance for its quality. This view
is obviously congenial—but not exclusive—to theories of welfare that treat
the satisfaction of one’s desires or other pro-attitudes as a primary deter-
minant of well-being.
Neither explanation plausibly captures the extent to which a life’s
shape is significant. Take first the Instrumental View. We can certainly stip-
ulate that the mere shape of a life itself has no instrumental effects. We
can imagine, for instance, that Simpson’s pain, and so on, is not gener-
ated by the mere downward slope of his life. We could imagine that he
doesn’t suffer a lick when it comes to the fact that he was once better-off,
but instead cares very deeply only about the wretchedness of his life
now, namely, that he’s in jail.11 ðVice versa for Nospmis.Þ Even with this
stipulation, however, the fact that Nospmis’s life takes an upward tra-
jectory and Simpson’s life takes a downward seems to say something very10. Whether the Pro-attitude View assigns intrinsic value to a life’s shape depends on
how we interpret the evaluative significance of pro-attitudes. Most will hold that pro-attitudes
confer intrinsic value on their objects. Indeed, this is the interpretation of the “desire satis-
faction” view held by Hobbes ðLeviathan, I.6Þ, Sidgwick ðThe Methods of Ethics, 111–12Þ, R. B.
Perry ðThe General Theory of Value ½Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954, 115Þ,
Peter Railton ð“Facts and Values,” in Facts, Values, and Norms ½Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2003, 43–68, 54Þ, David Lewis ð“Dispositional Theories of Value,” in Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 63 ½1989: 113–37, 117Þ, among others. However, some hold that the
best construal of a desire-satisfaction view holds that the bearer of intrinsic value is a con-
junctive state of affairs in which a person desires that f and f occurs. Under this interpre-
tation, the Pro-attitude View would not allow that the shape of a life itself possesses intrinsic
value ðinstead perhaps a form of contributory valueÞ; intrinsic value is possessed only by the
conjunctive state in which one takes a pro-attitude toward the shape of a life and in which
that shape occurs. I have argued elsewhere that the former approach is to be preferred ðsee
“Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle,” Philosophical Studies 157 ½2012: 267–85Þ
and so will assume that the Pro-attitude View is best interpreted as imparting intrinsic value to
a life’s shape. Not much rides on this claim, however, insofar as the Pro-attitude View in either
interpretation can in principle offer an explanation of SLH ðwhether the shape of a life is
intrinsically or simply contributorily valuableÞ, and its failure will have nothing to do with this
interpretive issue. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for calling my attention to this issue.
11. A reviewer suggests that this way of putting the example makes it sound far-fetched.
But I don’t share this skepticism. While it may be atypical, we could imagine that Simpson
just doesn’t care about the past—perhaps he has some sort of psychological disposition to
just “let the past go,” as it were. Even in this case, I hold that there is something good that
Nospmis’s life has that Simpson’s lacks.
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important about the quality of their lives; and if this is right, the signif-
icance of a life’s shape cannot simply be confined to instrumental value
in a way sufficient to accommodate a commonsense reaction to the dif-
ference between their lives.
The problem is even more serious for the Pro-attitude View. To say
that the evaluative significance of a life’s shape is sufficiently explained by
appeal to value-conferring pro-attitudes is to insist that for the shape of a
life to contribute to its value, its shape itselfmust be the object of a such an
attitude. But let’s say that we learn that neither Nospmis nor Simpson
maintained any desires ðpro or conÞ for a particular life’s shape. In other
words, let’s say that Nospmis, while she desired to get out of prison, de-
sired to be a successful coach, desired, even, to learn from her early mis-
takes or in some other way to redeem them, never actually possessed a
desire, the object of which was to have a life that maintained an upward
direction. Furthermore, let’s say that while Simpson desired not to have
his reputation sullied, and desired not to end up in the custody of the
Nevada state authorities, he doesn’t actually take any specific con-attitude
toward the shape of his life. In these cases, would we refuse to grant the
fact that Simpson’s life was such a tremendous downfall, and that Nosp-
mis’s life was such a magnificent turnaround no further evaluative sig-
nificance when coming to a judgment about the value of their lives? I
think the answer here is almost assuredly no. Or, at least, that is my con-
sidered judgment.
For this reason, even if the principles behind the Pro-attitude or
Instrumental views are true—which, as far as I can tell, they may very well
be—they are not of themselves sufficient to explain the significance of a
life’s shape.
IV. EXPLAINING SLH: THE RELATIONAL, LATER-IS-BETTER, AND
INTRINSIC VIEWS
The next three views are more promising. Call the first of these the Re-
lational View. For this view, the shape of a life is not intrinsically valuable
but is not strictly instrumentally valuable, either. Rather, the shape of a life
has signatory value: value as a sign of intrinsic value. According to the
Relational View, that which the shape of a life is a sign of contributes to the
intrinsic value of a life but is itself not temporally discrete: some con-
tributors to the intrinsic value of a life, on this view, cannot be locked down
to an individual moment but necessarily involve many moments through-
out a life and the relationship between them.
This approach is advocated by David Velleman, who writes:ll use Why would a person care about the placement of momentary goods
on the curve that maps his changing welfare? The answer, I believe,This content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
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All use is that an event’s place in the story of one’s life lends it a meaning
that isn’t entirely determined by its impact on one’s well-being at
the time. A particular electoral victory, providing a particular boost
to one’s current welfare, can mean either that one’s early frustra-
tions were finally over or that one’s subsequent failures were not yet
foreshadowed, that one enjoyed either fleeting good luck or lasting
success—all depending on its placement in the trend of one’s well-
being. And the event’s meaning is what determines its contribution
to the value of one’s life.
The meaning attached to a quantity of momentary well-being is
determined only in part by its place in the overall trend. Themeaning
of a benefit depends not only on whether it follows or precedes hard-
ships but also on the specific narrative relation between the goods
and evils involved.12For Velleman, an essential element in determining an individual’s life-
time welfare is not just the temporally discrete events that make up one’s
life, but the meaning of these events. However, the meaning of an indi-
vidual event is, unlike the event itself, indeterminable simply by consid-
ering the moment at which the event occurs. An event’s meaning can
only be determined by considering the relations—in particular narrative
relations—between this event and other events past or future. The mean-
ing, for instance, of Nospmis’s achievements in basketball coaching is very
different than the meaning of Simpson’s Heisman Trophy victory: one is
the culmination of a story of redemption, the other a prelude to shame
and disaster.
By way of an illustration, Velleman speaks about the value of learn-
ing from one’s misfortunes:Conferring instrumental value on a misfortune alters its meaning, its
significance in the story of one’s life. The misfortune still detracted
from one’s well-being at the time, but it no longer mars one’s life
story as it formerly did. A life in which one suffers a misfortune and
then learns from it may find one equally well-off, at each moment, as
a life in which one suffers a misfortune and then reads an encyclo-
pedia. But the costs of the misfortune are merely offset when the
value of the latter life is computed; whereas they are somehow can-
celled entirely from the accounts of the former. Or rather, neither
misfortune affects the value of one’s life just by adding costs and
benefits to a cumulative account. The effect of either misfortune on
one’s life is proportionate, not to its impact on one’s continuing
welfare, but to its import for the story. An edifying misfortune is not2. Velleman, “Well-Being and Time,” 63. Note that Velleman does not explicitly
ce the thesis that the shape of a life is signatorily valuable; nevertheless, this appears
an adequate reconstruction of his proposal.
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All use just offset but redeemed, by being given a meaningful place in one’s
progress through life.13For Velleman, though a misfortune is certainly bad, its impact on the
extent to which one lives a good life must be accounted for in terms of
its meaning, which cannot be determined in temporal isolation. The
meaning of some event in one’s life will depend on the narrative relations
between that event and other events, past and future. Worth stressing here
is that, for the Relational View, the mere trend is not itself intrinsically
good. For Velleman, it would not be just as good to learn from one’s
mistakes as it would be to fail to learn from one’s mistakes and to re-
ceive an equivalent benefit. However, even if it fails to assign intrinsic
value to a life’s shape, the Relational View still offers an explanation of
SLH. An upward-sloping life is signatorily valuable: a sign that the
events of one’s life are narratively related in valuable ways. The fact that
Simpson’s life takes such a manifest downward slope is a sign that his
life, though it was marked by a number of valuable events ðsuch as his
Heisman Trophy winÞ, is an overall failure. The shape of Nospmis’s life,
on the contrary, indicates a “rags to riches” story of redemption, the proj-
ect of being a successful basketball coach and inspiring public figure.
Though they both spend time in jail, Nospmis’s time is a meaningful
and important facet of those valuable narratives. Simpson’s, on the other
hand, is the sorry culmination of a wrecked public figure.
The Relational View admits of a variety of interpretations depending
on how one answers ðat leastÞ three questions. First, must we construe the
contribution of an individual event to the value of a life as in part a func-
tion strictly of its narrative relations? The answer here, as far as the Rela-
tional View is concerned, is surely not. It could be that various other
relations between the events of a life can affect their value. Thus focusing
on narrative relations is an interpretive choice on Velleman’s part and is
not essential to the view. ðI will focus on narrative relations simply for the
sake of honing in on a particular interpretation; nothing in what follows
will ride on the precise category of relations we identify.Þ Second, assum-
ing we select narrative relations as the proper category, which narratives
contribute positively to the quality of a life, which negatively? ðVelleman
punts on this question, claiming that a “good life story” just is the story of
a good life.Þ14 My proposal—again not essential for present purposes—
runs as follows. The narrative relations between events that affect mean-
ing in the most axiologically significant sense are those that help to tie
these events into something we might characterize as a global or long-3. Ibid., 65. A similar proposal is also advocated by Douglas Portmore in “Welfare,
vement, and Self-Sacrifice,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 ð2007Þ: 1–28.
4. Velleman, “Well-Being and Time,” 59.
This content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Dorsey Significance of a Life’s Shape 313
A
term “project,” “goal,” or, when successful, “achievement.”15 On this view,
someone maintains a long-term project when reference to this project
narratively unifies a significant number of discrete events throughout
their lives. For instance, one might maintain the project of being a world-
class tennis player; this project is made up of and helps to narratively unify
discrete events, such as taking up tennis, practicing, entering in tourna-
ments, winning, and so forth. An electoral victory can be part of a long-
term project of a successful political career; but it can also ðif a prelude
to subsequent failuresÞ be part of a project best characterized as a failed
political career, and less valuable given its failure.16
Third, the Relational View admits of a number of different ways to
understand the contribution of relevant narrative relations to the value of
a life. One might say that the narrative relations are themselves intrinsi-
cally valuable. Antti Kaupinnen accepts something like this interpreta-
tion: “Meaningfulness ½construed by Kaupinnen as possessing valuable
narrative relations is, I claim, non-instrumentally or finally valuable.”17
Velleman, instead, rejects the claim that narrative relations bear intrinsic
value.18 For Velleman, the events that make up a life are intrinsically valu-
able ðor disvaluableÞ, but the contribution of these events to the intrinsic
value of someone’s life ðin other words, how good or bad these events
are when it comes to the quality of one’s whole lifeÞ depends on the nar-
rative or other relations borne between that event and other events past
and future. On this proposal, valuable narrative relations are not intrinsi-
cally valuable, but instead possess “contributory” value: these relations in-
crease ðor decreaseÞ the contribution of said events to the overall value of
a life. ðOnce again, I’ll focus on Velleman’s proposal for the remainder,
noting that we needn’t accept Velleman’s proposal to accept the Rela-
tional View. This particular interpretive choice makes no difference to
the coming argument—save for one minor caveat; see n. 39.Þ
Stated simply, my interpretation of the Relational View runs like this:
the shape of a life is a sign of ðand is thus a signatorily valuable indicator
ofÞ the existence of important narrative relations between a life’s signifi-
cant events, relations that constitute the achievement ðor failureÞ of long-15. See Dale Dorsey, The Basic Minimum: AWelfarist Approach ðCambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012Þ, chap. 2.
16. A reviewer asks about the significance of the fact that a particular project is “long
term.” Could this in itself be an aspect of its value? Plausibly, yes. Maintaining a project that
structures and unifies one’s life over the long haul is a sui generis intrinsic value, a value not
possessed by projects, aims, etc., that happen, say, over the short term. But notice that this is
an interpretive choice; those who prefer a different view can accept the Relational View
without commitment to my axiological intuitions.
17. Antti Kaupinnen, “Meaningfulness and Time,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 84 ð2012Þ: 345–77, 371.
18. See Velleman, “Well-Being and Time,” 59, esp. 59 n. 8.
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term projects or the fulfillment of ðor the failure to fulfillÞ valuable long-
term goals, and so forth, and which help to determine the contribution of
these events to the overall quality of a life.
A fourth view—dubbed here the Later-Is-Better View—also treats the
shape of a life as maintaining signatory, rather than intrinsic or instru-
mental, value. The most important proponent of the Later-Is-Better View
is Michael Slote; I’ll let him speak for the view as follows:1
ll use A given man may achieve political power and, once in power, do
things of great value, after having been in the political wilderness
throughout his earlier career. . . . By contrast, another man may
have a meteoric success in youth, attaining the same office as the
first man and also achieving much good; but then lose power, while
still young, never to regain it. Without hearing anything more, I
think our natural, immediate reaction to these examples would be
that the first man was the more fortunate. . . . ½This seems to reflect
a sheer preference for goods that come later, of our assumption,
even, that a good may itself be greater for coming late rather than
early in life.19On this proposal, the signatory value possessed by a life’s shape is rela-
tively straightforward: intrinsic welfare goods get a multiplier for the time
at which they occur. The later the benefit, the greater the multiplier. This
explains the significance of a life’s shape: because we prefer goods that
occur later, Nospmis’s life is better because the goods she obtains are sub-
ject to a higher multiplier than Simpson’s. Simpson’s burdens, rather than
benefits, are magnified. And this is simply a result of the time at which they
occur in the individual’s life. Like the Relational View, the Later-Is-Better
View does not hold that the evaluative significance of a life’s shape is in-
trinsic, but rather signatory: a sign that the best things occurred when they
were most valuable.
The strongest interpretation of the significance of a life’s shape is
the Intrinsic View. In essence, this interpretation says that the right tem-
poral ordering of momentary intrinsic benefits within a life is intrinsically
valuable. In favor of this view, Joshua Glasgow writes:Reflect on how we feel about the losses of well-being that we suffer.
They are regrettable, they disappoint. We are inclined to sadness
or even hopelessness and depression when we reflect on the more
significant losses. Losses are, not coincidentally, a “downer.” If Dora
loses a loved one, it is bad for her not just that she has lost a loved
one, and that she is saddened by the fact for very many moments,
but also that her momentary well-being has been so significantly9. Slote, “Goods and Lives,” 23–25.
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All use diminished. It is bad to be worse off than you used to be. . . . There
is . . . badness in the losing: when I go from a high level of mo-
mentary well-being to a low level of momentary well-being, that itself
is bad for me.20A similar proposal is found in the work of Frances Kamm.21 According to
this view, the shape of a life is intrinsically valuable: it is worse in itself to
start high and end low, better in itself to start low and end high.
Before I evaluate the comparative merits of these explanations, a
point of comparison is worth noting. First, for the Relational View, though
lives displaying an upward, rather than downward, shape will typically
maintain the relevant underlying feature ði.e., a successful long-term
project or achievement, sayÞ, this is merely typical. After all, someone
could maintain a long-term project or achievement even if her life peaks
earlier rather than later. Thus, and this is the point of contrast, it could be
that, all other things being equal, a downward-sloping life is just as good
as an upward-sloping life. Not so for the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic views.
The Later-Is-Better View presents an instance of what Slote calls “pure
time preference”: we value goods that occur later in life, and hence ðother
things equalÞ, it is always better to have an upward, rather than down-
ward, sloping life. In addition, the Intrinsic View holds that a downward
trend is itself intrinsically bad, and an upward trend is itself intrinsically
good; intrinsically good life-shapes are those that start ðcomparativelyÞ
low and end ðcomparativelyÞ high. Keeping everything else constant, then,
the Intrinsic View will always claim that the upward-sloping life is the bet-
ter one. But for the Relational View, an upward slope is a good, but im-
perfect, sign of a life’s comparative quality.
V. IN FAVOR OF THE RELATIONAL VIEW
In this section, I hope to show that the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic views
go wrong in ways that tend to support the Relational View. I offer four
arguments.
A. The Lost Weekend
Both the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic views must say that the fact that good
moments within a life occur later enhances the value of that life. But I
think there is very little reason to suggest that this holds across an entire
life but not across temporally extended segments within a life. If we wish to
say that a life with an upward trajectory is better than a life with a down-0. Glasgow, “The Shape of a Life and the Value of Loss and Gain,” 668.
1. Frances Kamm, “Rescuing Ivan Ilyich: How We Live and How We Die,” Ethics 113
Þ: 202–33, 222–23.
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ward trajectory, other things equal, then we should say, for instance, that
a year with an upward trajectory is also better than a year with a down-
ward trajectory, and a weekend with an upward trajectory is better than
a weekend with a downward trajectory, other things equal.22




ll useThe Lost Weekend. On Friday, I went over to a friend’s house to
watch a Friday Night Football game, had a great time, but drank
rather too much. As a result, I was feeling very bad on Saturday, and
recovered only slightly on Sunday.Second:The Found Weekend. I drank rather too much on Thursday night.
As a consequence, was feeling very bad Friday, recovered only
slightly on Saturday, but was feeling fine on Sunday, when I went
over to a friend’s house to watch Sunday Night Football, and had a
great time.In both cases, I’m interested only in the relative quality of the temporal
segment Friday–Sunday ðcall this “the weekend”Þ. In the first case, the week-
end took a downward trajectory. Friday was great, but Saturday was awful,
and though Sunday was slightly better, it was still part of an overall down-
ward trajectory from Friday. In the case of the found weekend, however,
Friday starts out quite poorly, improves slightly, and gets much better, end-
ing up with a Sunday that was just as good as the lost weekend’s Friday.
Is it plausible to say that the found weekend is better than the lost
weekend, if we assume that the lows are just as low and the highs are just
as high? I think not. The mere fact that one was sick on Friday and Sat-
urday rather than Saturday and Sunday seems to me to make very little
difference to the overall quality of the Friday-Sunday temporal segment.
But according to the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic views, the found week-
end must be preferable. For the Later-Is-Better View, it would appear that
the welfare benefits that occur during the found weekend occur later than
the welfare benefits that occur during the lost weekend. And hence if we
have a general preference for late-occurring welfare goods, we should
prefer the found weekend to the lost weekend. For the Intrinsic View,
the found weekend is surely better insofar as it takes an upward trajec-
tory rather than a downward trajectory. But both answers seem wrong.
Generally, though it may seem plausible to prefer later-occurring goods
rather than early-occurring goods, or a gain to a loss, the plausibility of2. To put this somewhat more precisely, the value of a year in which the synchronic
re score of later times is higher than that of earlier times is better than a year in which
nchronic welfare score of earlier times is higher than that of later times ðother things
equalÞ; mutatis mutandis for weekends, etc.
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such an idea wanes when focused on short-term rather than long-term
periods.
Two responses to this argument are worth considering. First, the
partisan of either the Intrinsic or Later-Is-Better View might suggest that
there is no reason to believe that the significance of a life’s shape must
also extend to the significance of a weekend’s shape. But this response is
implausible and ad hoc.23 In particular, we could imagine a life that simply
consisted of a weekend of this kind. Why not think about the cases above
simply as lives that “pop into existence” on Friday, and then pop out of ex-
istence on Sunday? Surely this is at least coherent.24 In this case a week-
end’s shape just is a life’s shape. But even so, it seems wrong to think that
the life consisting in the found weekend is better than the life consisting
in the lost weekend. Second, both the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic Views
seem explicitly committed to the claim that the shape of a weekend can
affect its value. If, as is held by the Later-Is-Better View, we have a pure time
preference for later-occurring goods, then this pure time preference surely
applies to goods that occur later in temporal segments of a life, as well
as the life as a whole. And if, as is held by the Intrinsic View, losing is
itself a disvalue, it must be the case that the lost weekend is worse than
the found weekend: the latter features gain, the former features loss.2523. Kamm writes that one potential explanation for the intrinsic value of a life’s shape is
that “decline within a life emphasizes vulnerability, of both a higher state and retention of what
one has already had, within life. Ending on the high pointmeans that only death, not life itself,
in fact ends the good” ðKamm, “Rescuing Ivan Ilyich,” 222–23Þ. But even if we accepted this
explanation ðindeed, Kamm offers a further explanation that is compatible with believing that
the lost weekend is worse than the found weekendÞ, this explanation would also support the
value of the found weekend if life ended on Monday. But this is no more plausible.
24. A reviewer casts doubt on the coherence of this idea. One might say, for instance,
that a mere three-day period couldn’t properly be called a life, just as three pages out of a
novel couldn’t properly be called a story. But I doubt the analogy. Surely we could imagine
people, if purely as an exercise in thought, that pop into existence on Friday, pop out of
existence on Sunday. And while we might not think of this as anything like a typical human
life, it is still a life. It doesn’t have much of a story, perhaps, but it certainly can have a shape.
25. Glasgow explicitly accepts this result. See Glasgow, “The Shape of a Life and the
Value of Loss and Gain,” 670. However, it is unclear whether Slote would accept it. For
Slote, our “sheer preference” for later goods goes hand-in-hand with a preference for later
times of life ðsay, the “prime of life” in comparison to childhood or old ageÞ. And given that
the difference between Friday and Sunday doesn’t constitute a difference between times of
life in this sense, there may be no reason to display a preference for the found weekend.
But there are reasons to believe that Slote, in fact, does accept an evaluative difference
between the lost and found weekends: Slote presents the “sheer preference for goods that
come later” as a distinct thesis from our preference for the prime of life ðSlote, “Goods and
Lives,” 23–25Þ; and hence—insofar as there is reason to believe that this preference op-
erates whenever goods occur later rather than earlier—Slote’s account would prefer the
found weekend to the lost weekend. This reading, however, is somewhat tentative, in which
case I’m willing to withdraw the present objection as an objection specifically to Slote’s
view, rather than other versions of the Later-Is-Better View ðand the Intrinsic ViewÞ.
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Second, it might be suggested that I’ve cooked the books by adding
that the found weekend includes Thursday night. Here’s why. By includ-
ing this, it would appear that the found weekend and lost weekend are
really the same in terms of their activities, it’s just that the found week-
end begins, more or less, on Thursday, the lost weekend, more or less, on
Friday. According to the views in question, the temporal ordering of one’s
momentary goods matters, but it doesn’t matter whether a particular
temporal sequence of goods begins on Thursday or Friday. Response: this
misses the point of the objection. A life can be carved up into many dif-
ferent temporal segments. But the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic views are
committed to the relevance of shape for any such temporal segments.
Thursday might be relevant, of course, to the overall quality of life. But
this is not at issue here. We’re interested only in the relative quality of the
weekend.
The Relational View can avoid this problem. After all, part of the ex-
planation of the significance of a life’s shape for this view is that it gener-
ally has a tendency to signify the presence or absence of long-termprojects
or achievements ðor, more generally, valuable narrative relations between
significant life eventsÞ. But whether or not one was hung over on Friday
and Saturday rather than Saturday and Sunday surely has very little to do
with the extent to which a given person achieved his or her goals or main-
tained long-term projects. And hence the Relational View appears to be
able to distinguish the shape of a weekend from the shape of a life in a way
that the Later-Is-Better or Intrinsic views cannot.
Someone might claim that the Relational View’s advantage here is
chimerical. Surely there are narrative relations between the events that
occur during the lost and found weekends. After all, the lost weekend is a
lost weekend!26 Of course, this is correct. Indeed, it may seem perfectly
trivial that any “upward-downward” or vice versa arrangement of tempo-
rally discrete benefits could be unified by at least some sort of narrative
relation. But the question here is: does the most plausible interpretation
of the nature of valuable narratives deliver the verdict, contrary to con-
sidered judgment, that the found weekend is better than the lost week-
end? No. Two points: first, nothing in my own interpretation of the Re-
lational View yields this verdict. After all, whether one had a found or lost
weekend surely does not influence the extent to which one’s long-term
projects were valuable and/or successful. Of course, it’s open to anyone to
reject my interpretation of the Relational View in favor of another. But the
second, more important, point is that in coming to a proper first-order
theory of valuable narratives, it is open to the partisan of the Relational
View to consult our considered judgments concerning the value of lives or
temporal segments that display those narratives. If we find, as I do, that
there is no difference in the quality of the lost weekend or the found26. Thanks to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen for helpful comments here.
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weekend, this should be evidence enough that whatever narrative rela-
tion the found weekend displays is not of value. Unfortunately for the
Later-Is-Better or Intrinsic views, there is no such intuitive flexibility: they
are simply stuck with the value of the found weekend, rather than the lost.
This is an advantage, if modest, of the Relational View.
B. Sensory Pleasure
Another feature of the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic views is that it is good
for someone to have an upward-sloping order of intrinsic benefits and
burdens, no matter what these benefits or burdens are.27 But this, it seems
to me, is extremely implausible.
Take, for instance, two individuals hooked up to machines that when
activated stimulate their neural pleasure receptors.28 The only intrinsic
benefits these individuals maintain while they are hooked up are momen-
tary instances of sensory pleasure. And let’s say that they are hooked up
for the duration of their lives. No plausible theory of welfare will claim that
the pleasure they experience is not of intrinsic value. But we might now
compare two different experiments. The first person is hooked up to a
pleasure-stimulating computer with software designed to start his life at a
neutral level; no pleasure, no pain. Gradually, say, twice a year, the plea-
sure is increased in a linear fashion. The second is precisely the oppo-
site: this person’s machine starts out with quite a lot of pleasure. Grad-
ually, also twice per year, the software decreases the pleasure in a linear
fashion, such that both people, over the course of their lives, will generate
the same amount of sensory pleasure.
For the Later-Is-Better view, the upward-sloping life is better, not be-
cause of the intrinsically valuable slope, but because the instances of plea-
sure are themselves better when they occur later rather than earlier. In
addition, according to the Intrinsic View, the first person lives a better life
than the second. But this seems to me, once again, quite implausible. If I
live my entire life simply being sensorily stimulated by some computer, sim-
ply undergoing the barest sensory pleasure, how could it possibly matter
when this pleasure occurs? Once again, the Relational View holds serve.
Because the only intrinsic values that the people in question maintain are
bare moments of sensory pleasure, there is no chance of either person de-
veloping or living according to long-term projects or goals or develop-
ing any other set of valuable narrative relations between a life’s events.
Thus an upward or downward trend for those whose only welfare goods
are instances of the barest sensory pleasure makes no difference.27. A similar argument is given in Dale Dorsey, “First Steps in an Axiology of Goals,”
International Journal of Wellbeing 1 ð2011Þ: 167–85.
28. I mean this to be similar to J. J. C. Smart’s human analogue of an infamous
experiment based on self-stimulated rats. See J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utili-
tarianism: For and Against ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974Þ, 18–20.
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C. The Consistently Well-Off
One thing that seems to lend plausibility to SLH is a consideration of lives,
like those of Simpson and Nospmis, for which the highs are pretty high
and for which the lows are pretty low. But what if we abstract from this
feature and instead assume that, no matter what happens, the people in
question are doing very well?
Imagine, for instance, two people whose lives are equally successful.
They achieve all they set out to achieve and do so with a high degree of
accomplishment. Further, assume that their success is more or less con-
stant throughout their lives and, to the extent that this is possible, one can
assume that the narrative structures of their lives aren’t marked by any
substantial lows. Also assume that these individuals, once a week, have a
glass of red wine and enjoy it, and take the same total amount of pleasure
in wine throughout their lives. But now assume that the extent to which
both individuals take pleasure in their weekly wine decreases and in-
creases, respectively; the first starts his career by taking substantial plea-
sure in wine, but slightly less as the years go on, opposite for the second
person. If we assume that everything else is equal, we should also assume
that the first person’s life, on the whole, gets worse as it goes on, the sec-
ond person’s life, on the whole, gets better.
Once again, it seems to me implausible to believe that the first life is
worse than the second, simply because of the temporal order in which
they take pleasure in wine. If we assume that both lives in question are
relatively well-off even in their lowest moments, it seems less plausible to
believe that the mere shape of a life—independently of any additional
base-level goods—could matter to the quality of that life. While the Later-
Is-Better and Intrinsic views cannot accommodate this verdict—because
the enjoyment of wine increases rather than decreases, both proposals
must say that the second person’s life is better—the Relational View can:
the extent to which my enjoyment of a weekly glass of wine increases or
decreases throughout my life does not itself indicate anything like an
important or valuable narrative relation between these events. No proj-
ects, achievements, or goals are affected, say, by a gradually increasing or
decreasing enjoyment of wine ðex hypothesiÞ. The Relational View thus
can deliver the right answer.
D. The Manager and the Fullback
Finally, recall that for both the Later-Is-Better and Intrinsic views, a com-
paratively “upward”-sloping life is better, other things equal, than a com-
paratively “downward”-sloping life. To put this another way, these views
claim that there is always at least a reason ðeven if not an overriding
reasonÞ to favor an upward rather than downward slope. The Relational
View differs. It could be, depending on the structure of the underlyingThis content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
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narratives, that a downward-sloping life is just as good as its mirror image.
This is the right answer. Take two examples:ll useJack McKeon. Jack McKeon is a career baseball man whose playing
days were entirely in the minor leagues, but who gradually showed
success in the minors as a manager. In 1973 he was promoted to
manage the Kansas City Royals, and went on to manage in and out
of the majors with moderate success until 2003, when he took over
the underperforming Florida Marlins and led them to a World Se-
ries title, retiring from baseball in 2005 ðwith one brief return in 2011Þ
at age 75.Compare McKeon with:John Riggins. John Riggins was the fullback and primary ball carrier
for the NFL’s Washington franchise during the late 1970s and early
’80s. Riggins was a crucial member of the high-powered 1982 and
’83 offense, which included his iconic “70 Chip” touchdown run in
Super Bowl XVII, widely regarded as one of most significant plays
in American professional football. Riggins retired from football
in 1985, and after flirting with a career in acting, eventually settled
down as a regional sports broadcaster, providing occasional commen-
tary. He is currently the host of The John Riggins Show on Radio WTOP,
Washington.Though there are a number of unknowns about the lives of John Riggins
and Jack McKeon, one thing is relatively certain: barring some massive un-
forseen set of circumstances, John Riggins’s synchronic welfare levels
peaked substantially earlier than McKeon’s. McKeon’s greatest success
came as a baseball manager well into his seventies. Not so with Riggins;
his life’s highest point ðor so we can assume for the sake of argumentÞ came
at age thirty-three. And though neither McKeon nor Riggins have had any-
thing like the dramatic downfall of O. J. Simpson or the dramatic rise of
J. O. Nospmis, we can assume that McKeon’s life takes an upward trajec-
tory, Riggins’s a downward.
Without a heck of a lot more information we won’t be able to say any-
thing definitive about the relative quality of these lives. But the following
seems relatively clear to me: the mere fact that McKeon’s life takes an up-
ward trend is not of itself a reason to favor his life in comparison to
Riggins’s. And the explanation appears to play straightforwardly into the
hands of the Relational View. The life stories of both Riggins andMcKeon
are the stories of very good lives: McKeon’s of the successful baseball man-
ager, Riggins’s of the Hall of Fame running back. Both achieved valued
and highly valuable projects; the fact that Riggins’s life peaked earlier
and McKeon’s life peaked later is appropriate to the projects they main-This content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
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tain. Just because the high points of the latter occur earlier in life than
the high points of the former seems to me no reason to favor one project
ðor narrative, storyÞ rather than the other. They are both excellent.
Thus where the Relational View is more restrained in its treatment
of the relative value of upward and downward trends is precisely where
we should be more restrained. We should not hold that the shape of a
life is a sui generis intrinsic value; nor should we say that welfare goods
are better simply because they occur later in life. But a life’s shape can
very often, though not always, be an indicator of an underlying benefit,
namely, the extent to which the events of one’s life maintain valuable rela-
tions, such as those that constitute successful projects or achievements.
Given the balance of evidence, I conclude that the best explanation of
the significance of a life’s shape is the Relational View.
VI. DOES SLH THREATEN TN?
The Relational View is the best account of the significance of a life’s
shape. It seems right to say that the shape of a life is the sign of the pres-
ence of evaluatively significant projects, or other goods that are depen-
dent on the relations between temporally discrete events. At this point I’d
like to turn to the second question with which this article is concerned:
does SLH, as explained here, threaten temporal neutrality or intralife ag-
gregation?
Consider, first, temporal neutrality. TN claims that the temporal loca-
tion of good and bad times does not affect their value. According to Slote
and Temkin, SLH threatens the requirement of temporal neutrality in a
way that tends to look bad for TN: because upward-sloping lives are better
than downward-sloping lives, the contribution to the welfare of a life of a
particular good time is in part determined by when it arrives.29 And hence,
or so it would seem, because we should accept SLH, we should reject TN.
But notice that the reasoning leading from SLH to the denial of TN re-
lies explicitly on certain explanations of the significance of a life’s shape.
For instance, the Later-Is-Better View is incompatible with TN—this view
quite clearly violates temporal neutrality insofar as it expresses a pure time
preference for later-arriving goods: later-arriving goods are better. In ad-
dition, the Intrinsic View is also incompatible with TN: because gains in
welfare are intrinsically valuable, the contribution to the value of a life of
a particular good time will tend to increase if the good arrives later: only
in so doing can it help to represent a gain. According to the Intrinsic
View, the prudentially rational agent, if he or she has the opportunity
to distribute a particular welfare good f either to her earlier self or to
her later self, will prefer to distribute f to her later self.29. Slote, “Goods and Lives,” 10–13. Temkin, Rethinking the Good, 96–97, 108–9.
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But this inconsistency does not arise for the Relational View. The
prudentially rational individual, according to the Relational View, will not
prefer valuable events or other goods given their temporal location but
instead will prefer goods given their narrative relations to other events,
past and future, in his or her life. Whether such goods bear these narrative
relations, as seen in the cases of Riggins andMcKeon, does not depend on
their temporal ordering.30 Of course, it could be that for many events the
quality of the particular narrative relations they bear can be affected by
their temporal location—see, for instance, Simpson andNospmis. But this
doesn’t say that the temporal location of such goods is itself evaluatively
significant; any importance possessed by an event’s temporal location is
strictly derivative and hence compatible with TN. As far as the Relational
View is concerned, the hereafter, as such, is not regarded as more or less
than now.
VII. DOES SLH THREATEN ILA?
Temporal neutrality has nothing to fear from SLH. This fact is a direct
result of the success of the Relational View in comparison to its most im-
portant competitors. But the news may be worse for ILA. Indeed, the Re-
lational View might seem to obviously cause problems for an aggregative
approach to whole-life welfare. After all, for this approach, the shape of
a life is a sign of evaluatively significant features of a life that are not tem-
porally discrete. But synchronic welfare is temporally discrete. One might
put this more precisely: insofar as the contribution of a specific event e to
the welfare quality of a life l must depend on the relations ðe.g., narrative
relationsÞ between e and other events f, g, . . . , and insofar as the rela-
tions between e and other events are not temporally local to the time at
which e occurs, it would appear that the synchronic welfare level a per-
son maintains at the time of e cannot be the entire story of the contri-
bution of e to the welfare level of the life containing e. And hence life-
time welfare cannot simply be an aggregate of synchronic welfare.3130. Indeed, this is true even if we hold, as Kaupinnen does, that the narrative relations
possessed by life events are themselves intrinsically valuable. To see this, note that valuable
relations will unfold over either the entire course of a life or simply part of a life. If the
former, the valuable narrative relations themselves will not be temporally located within the
duration of a life. But atemporal goods trivially satisfy TN: because they do not occur at any
time during a life, the time during a life at which they occur makes no difference to their
value. However, if they unfold over the course of only part of a life, the temporal segment of
one’s life over which they unfold is irrelevant to their value.
31. This argument is somewhat complicated by the fact that, as a reviewer points out,
events can be extended in time. Plausibly, my daughter’s birth is not located at a specific
individual time but is spread out over, say, a matter of hours or days. Indeed, time may it-
self be continuous; hence any event is trivially temporally extended. However, these com-
plications don’t really spell trouble for the coming argument. One could simply read the
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A. Velleman’s Rejection of ILA
Velleman endorses precisely this reasoning. He writes: “Intuitively speak-
ing, the reason why well-being isn’t additive is that how a person is faring
at a particular moment is a temporally local matter, whereas the welfare
value of a period in his life depends on the global features of that period.”32
More strongly: “The value judgments considered above are incompatible
with any reduction of diachronic well-being to synchronic well-being, no
matter how sophisticated an algorithm of discounting and weighting is
applied. Because an event’s contribution to the value of one’s life depends
on its narrative relation to other events, a life’s value can never be com-
puted by an algorithm applied to bare amounts of momentary well-being,
or even to ordered sequences of such amounts, in abstraction from the
narrative significance of the events with which they are associated.”33
Velleman’s argument against ILA seems to boil down to two points. Point
one: the synchronic value of a moment will be determined, strictly speak-
ing, by the discrete events or other goods that occur at that moment.34 To
put this another way, the synchronic welfare value of a time t will be de-
termined by facts that occur at t ðincluding eÞ. But, point two: the contri-
bution to diachronic welfare ðwelfare across a period of time, including
a lifeÞ of e depends on facts that occur at times other than t ðincluding the
extent to which e bears axiologically significant relations to other events
past and futureÞ. Thus diachronic welfare ðincluding lifetime welfareÞ is
determined not simply by aggregating the synchronic welfare of the in-
dividual moments, but by taking seriously the “interactions between the
value of what obtains and happens then and the value of earlier or later
events.”35









ll use 1. ILA is true only if the diachronic welfare score of a segment of
time can be determined by summing synchronic welfare scores
of the moments that occur during that segment of time.
2. The relations ðespecially narrative relationsÞ between intrinsi-
cally valuable, but temporally discrete, events or other goods
can themselves be a determinant of diachronic welfare.2. Velleman, “Well-Being and Time,” 58.
n of “synchronic” well-being as the well-being scores contributed by particular events
time or times at which they occur. The key for Velleman’s argument is that these
s—the scores located in particular times contributed by events that occur at those
—do not bear an additive relation to the value of a life as a whole.
3. Ibid., 72.
4. Ibid., 74, 77–78.
5. Ibid., 78.
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All use 3. The relations between intrinsically valuable, but temporally dis-
crete, events cannot be reflected in the contribution of these
events to per se synchronic welfare.
4. Hence the diachronic welfare score of a segment of time can-
not be determined by summing synchronic welfare scores that
occur during that segment of time.
5. Hence ILA is false.B. How to Accept the Relational View and ILA
Velleman relies on a controversial assumption concerning the method
by which synchronic well-being is determined. According to Velleman,
as stated in premise ð3Þ, synchronic well-being cannot be affected by the
narrative relations of temporally discrete welfare goods. But one can
deny this. One might hold, instead, that the narrative relations borne by
individual, temporally discrete events help determine not only the con-
tribution of these events to diachronic welfare but also the contribution
of these events to synchronic welfare. In other words, one might accept:ð30Þ The relation between intrinsically valuable, but temporally dis-
crete, events can be reflected in the contribution of these events to
per se synchronic welfare.According to ð30Þ, the good times in life are better when an individual is
benefited, at that time, by an event that is related in the right ways to other
events, past and future ðon my view, whether the events help to make
up successful, rather than unsuccessful, or valuable, rather than disvalu-
able, long-term projectsÞ. Velleman treats the contribution of events to
synchronic and diachronic welfare asymmetrically: the meaning of these
events can only affect diachronic, not synchronic, welfare. I hold the op-
posite: the meaning of particular events—in particular, their narrative re-
lations—can affect their intrinsic contribution to synchronic welfare ðand,
thereby, diachronic welfare, including the welfare of a whole lifeÞ. On this
view, an event’s contribution to synchronic welfare is jointly determined
not just by the temporally discrete features of that event but also by that
event’s valuable relations to other events.
This proposal is compatible with the Relational View. Recall that, for
this view, the shape of a life is a sign of valuable narrative relations be-
tween intrinsically valuable events, relations that help to shape the con-
tribution of those events to the quality of one’s life. But there is nothing
in the Relational View that requires one to say that the narrative relations
borne by these intrinsically valuable events must only be reflected in dia-
chronic welfare. The shape of a life continues to maintain the relevant sig-
natory significance even if the relations borne by the relevant events can
help to determine their synchronic value. For instance, consider a typicallyThis content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
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valuable event in a life, such as winning the Heisman Trophy. This event,
surely important for synchronic well-being, could be a stepping stone,
or merely a teaser: early success followed by a disastrous and shameful
downfall. If it is a stepping stone to future success, one might say that the
synchronic value of this event is greater than the synchronic value of an
identical event which is just a teaser. For O. J. Simpson, his Heisman vic-
tory was, in fact, less synchronically valuable given what we now know: that
it helped to frame his ever-so-public downfall.36
It is worth distinguishing the view I sketch here from other proposals
Velleman addresses. First, Velleman discusses a defense of ILA that starts,
as it were, backwards; by first calculating a lifetime well-being score and
then dividing and assigning that lifetime welfare score to particular times
within a life. In this way, lifetime welfare is explanatorily prior ðbut is never-
theless equivalent to an aggregate sum ofÞ synchronic welfare.37 This is not
my proposal. My view holds that synchronic welfare is explanatorily prior
to lifetime welfare; it just so happens that the contribution to synchronic
welfare of temporally discrete events or other goods in a life can be affected
by the relations these temporally discrete goods and bads bear to other
events, and so forth. Second, Velleman discusses a proposal according to
which events that occur in the future can of themselves determine one’s
past synchronic well-being. While I actually accept this view, nothing I
discuss here depends on it.38 It simply depends on the ðto my mind rather
simpleÞ presumption that the contribution of a particular event to the syn-
chronic welfare score of a particular moment can be affected by the rela-
tions that this event bears to future or past events.3936. One might argue that, in fact, ð30Þ vitiates the Relational View. Because the
meaning of individual events can affect their momentary value, it would appear that the
relations themselves affect the value of good and bad moments. Given, e.g., that Nospmis’s
early failures are made better by her subsequent success, is it really the case, in other words,
that her life takes an upward shape in terms of momentary well-being at all? The answer, of
course, is yes. Just because a low moment can be rendered better by its narrative relations
does not entail that it is not low—especially given that the “high” moments are also made
comparatively better given the hardship that came before. Hence there remains a signa-
torily valuable shape of a life if we accept ð30Þ.
37. Kaupinnen suggests this proposal. For Kaupinnen, we “assign a value to particu-
lar moments when we have the whole life in view” ðKaupinnen, “Meaningfulness and Time,”
374–75Þ.
38. See Dale Dorsey, “Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal,” Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice 16 ð2013Þ: 151–71. To see the difference, note that I’m not saying that a
particular event e could make me better off at a time earlier than e occurred. Rather, I’m
suggesting that while the synchronic welfare value of e accrues at its moment of occur-
rence, this value is in part determined by the relations between e and nonconcurrent events,
f, g, and h.
39. What about those who accept an alternative interpretation of the Relational View,
namely, that narrative relations are themselves intrinsically valuable? After all, it would
appear that, according to ð30Þ, only the events that constitute such projects are of intrinsic
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C. Must We Accept ð3Þ?
I’d like to take aminute to review the dialectic. SLH—given the Relational
View—is compatible with either ð3Þ or ð30Þ. Given this, anyone who insists
that SLH threatens ILA must establish that there is independent ground
to accept ð3Þ rather than ð30Þ—independent, that is, of any prior commit-
ment to the acceptance or rejection of ILA. But this claim, or so I shall
now argue, is quite implausible.
To begin, ð30Þ is more plausible than ð3Þ. Indeed, the synchronic value
of individual events is rarely divorced from the narrative relations these
events bear to others. For instance, imagine that a person simply stumbles
randomly into a theater packed with college athletes and happens to win
the Heisman Trophy. We might characterize this event as a good thing for
this person. But this moment ði.e., the moment of winning the Heisman
TrophyÞ would surely not be as good for that person as the very same
moment in the life of a person who worked for years to develop the skill
and talent to win the Heisman and displayed consistent excellence on
the field.40
For this reason, I think there is good reason to dispute ð3Þ in favor
of ð30Þ. But it is worth considering Velleman’s argument against ð30Þ. He
writes: “a person’s well-being at each moment is defined from the per-
spective of thatmoment.”41 Again: “estimates ofmomentary well-being are
made within a restricted context—namely, the context of the events and
circumstances of the moment.”42 Note that this claim, while plausible,
permits of two interpretations. The first is to hold that the contribution40. This advantage of ð30Þ is also possessed by ð300Þ: insofar as a particular event, such as
winning the Heisman Trophy, is part of a project, it is plausible to say that the time at which
one wins theHeisman Trophy is all the better for it, and hence if, say, long-term projects are
intrinsically valuable, they can also contribute to how an individual fares at a time—the
time at which the project-constituting events occur.
41. Velleman, “Well-Being and Time,” 74.
42. Ibid., 78.
value, though part of their intrinsic value depends on the extent to which they maintain
valuable relations ðe.g., are part of a long-term project, sayÞ. But this does not entail that
this interpretation entails ð3Þ. Consider ð300Þ: Intrinsically valuable projects, or other nar-
rative relations between temporally discrete events, can contribute to the synchronic wel-
fare scores of times at which such temporally discrete events occur. Put another way, ð300Þ
holds that long-term projects or other narrative relations are intrinsically valuable, but
these relations influence synchronic welfare, in particular the synchronic welfare scores of
times at which the most significant events of those projects take place. ðThis proposal is
suggested by John Broome on behalf of the “principle of temporal good”; see Weighing
Goods ½Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, 228–29.Þ The fact that an event e, taking place at t , has a
certain relation to another event f at t 1 is intrinsically valuable. But this fact contributes
to the synchronic welfare scores of t and t 1. ðIf the valuable project is, say, being a suc-
cessful football player, it makes sense to hold that the synchronic impact of that project
is strongest at the time at which one wins the Heisman Trophy.Þ It seems to me that the
arguments in favor of ð30Þ, explored below, translate mutatis mutandis to ð300Þ.
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to the synchronic welfare value of a temporally discrete good ðsuch as a par-
ticular eventÞ is just determined by the value of the temporally discrete
good that occurs at the time in question. But this interpretation does not
tell against ð30Þ. According to ð30Þ, the contribution to synchronic value of
a temporally discrete event, say, is determined by the intrinsic value of the
event, which in turn can be affected by the relations this event bears to
other events that occur throughout the course of a life, including narra-
tive relations.43 The second interpretation, however, is much stronger:
it holds that the synchronic welfare score of a particular time must be
determined by the temporally discrete goods that occur at that time, ab-
stracting from any consideration of the relations that such temporally dis-
crete goods bear to other goods, past or future, including narrative re-
lations.44 But stated this way, Velleman’s claim is just a bare assertion of
ð3Þ rather than ð30Þ and hence has no power to tell in favor of the former.45
Indeed, there appears to be very little at stake between ð3Þ and ð30Þ.
Premise ð30Þ need not issue judgments concerning the quality of lives that
are in any way different than ð3Þ: if we allow that the narrative relations43. Some may argue that I’m misusing the term “intrinsic value.” “Intrinsic value” just
refers to value that supervenes on intrinsic properties. ðSee, for instance, Christine Kors-
gaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” inCreating the Kingdom of Ends ½Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996, 249–74.Þ And while I take issue with this conceptual iden-
tification, I don’t wish to engage in a dispute about words. In referring to “intrinsic value”
I mean simply to pick out the value that matters to the quality of a life ð“final value,” per-
hapsÞ. Thanks to Fred Feldman for pressing this objection.
44. Indeed, it seems that this is the interpretation Velleman has in mind. See Velle-
man, “Well-Being and Time,” 78. Notice that in accepting the claim that SLH tells against
ILA, Glasgow simply assumes that “momentary value” is “nonrelational.” But this seems to
me to guarantee the denial of ILA by fiat and is utterly uninteresting to boot. Even if we
adopted Glasgow’s language, the most important question would be: is all momentary well-
being nonrelational? A plausible answer, given my argument here, is “no.” See Glasgow,
“The Shape of a Life and the Value of Loss and Gain,” 666.
45. One might be tempted to believe that ð30Þ is threatened by the view according to
which the intrinsic value ðincluding intrinsic prudential valueÞ of a particular good f en-
tirely supervenes on the intrinsic properties of f. ðCall this the “Moorean” constraint.Þ Note
that ð30Þ is incompatible with the Moorean constraint. The relations borne between a tem-
porally discrete event are obviously not intrinsic to that event. And so if the Moorean con-
straint is correct, we cannot accept ð30Þ and, hence, so it would appear, to accept the Rela-
tional View would be to reject ILA. But there are three problems here. First, Velleman’s view
seems to hold that the contribution of events to diachronic welfare can be affected by the
relational properties of these events, andhencehis view can gainno support from theMoorean
constraint. Second, if we reject Velleman’s interpretation and instead claim ðalong with ½300Þ
that it is not the event, but rather, say, the fact of a narrative relation itself that is intrinsically
valuable, there is no reason to believe that this interpretation need threaten the Moorean
constraint—this proposal need not suggest that the extrinsic properties of the relevant facts
affect its intrinsic value. Third, even leaving aside all this, there are well-rehearsed reasons to
reject the Moorean constraint. See, for instance, Dorsey, “Intrinsic Value and the Super-
venience Principle”; Shelly Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” Journal of Ethics 2 ð1998Þ:
277–97; Tom Hurka, “Two Kinds of Organic Unity,” Journal of Ethics 2 ð1998Þ: 299–320.
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between events can affect the contribution of those events to synchronic
welfare, it would appear that ð30Þ, together with ILA, will rank-order lives
in precisely the same way as a view that rejects ILA given ð3Þ. In addition,
there would appear to be no prudential reasons that one proposal ac-
cepts what the other denies: both hold that it is better for the events of
one’s life to have a valuable meaning or set of narrative relations; the
only difference is whether the significance of this meaning is assigned to
synchronic welfare or strictly to diachronic welfare. Furthermore, while I
believe that there is independent reason to accept ð30Þ, as I already indi-
cated, I am willing to grant that a direct appeal to the plausibility of ð3Þ
or ð30Þ is or will be inconclusive: it could very well be that both proposals
pass a threshold of reasonable plausibility.
So far, we have searched in vain to find an independent reason to
reject ð30Þ in favor of ð3Þ. Conclusion: there is no reason to reject ILA on
the basis of SLH—that is, independent of the acceptance of ILA. The
only reason to reject ð30Þ in favor of ð3Þ just is the fate of ILA itself. If we
find that intralife aggregation should be accepted, we will accept ð30Þ. If
we reject intralife aggregation, we may be tempted by ð3Þ. But if the only
thing that determines whether we accept ð3Þ or ð30Þ is ILA itself, whether
we accept ILA given SLH can only be determined by a prior examination
of the merits of ILA. And hence SLH of itself need not threaten the pos-
sibility of intralife aggregation. Given the Relational View, SLH is ILA-
neutral.
VIII. RELEARNING FROM SLH
In this article, I have conducted an inquiry into the significance of a
life’s shape. I have argued that the Relational View is the most success-
ful underlying explanation of why the shape of a person’s life matters.
An upward-sloping life is, typically ðthough not alwaysÞ, a sign of eval-
uatively significant relations ðincluding narrative relationsÞ between a
life’s temporally discrete events. In accepting the Relational View, I have
denied that there is anything intrinsically valuable when it comes to the
shape of a life.
In accepting this view, however, we accept a view that presents no
threat to TN. In addition, the impact of SLH on ILA depends on whether
we can or cannot interpret the various relations between individual tem-
porally discrete events as having an impact on their intrinsic contribution
to synchronic, or “momentary” welfare. But I have argued that whether we
accept that the value of such relations is located in synchronic or dia-
chronic ðincluding lifetimeÞ well-being will be determined by our prior
commitment to ILA or its rejection. Hence SLH, of itself, threatens nei-
ther TN nor ILA.
Before concluding, I offer one parting reflection. I hold that a close
examination of the significance of a life’s shape indicates that the litera-This content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
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ture on well-being has, by and large, drawn the wrong lesson from this
important phenomenon. As noted above, discussions of SLH are almost
always focused on the debate between additive theorists and their de-
tractors, lessons I have already shown it cannot teach. Though we may
reject intralife aggregation or temporal neutrality, perhaps for many good
reasons, it is illegitimate to do so simply on the basis of the significance of
a life’s shape.
But if this is correct, if SLH does not tell us anything meaningful
about temporal neutrality or intralife aggregation, what is, as it were, the
significance of the significance of a life’s shape? What do we learn from
our reactions to Simpson, Nospmis, and Guy MacKendrick? I think the
answer is this. Looking closely at SLH doesn’t tell us anything about how
a life should be structured over time. But it tells us much about what is
choice-worthy in a life at any time. Indeed, this is a result unique to the
Relational View. Given this, SLH is a powerful argument in favor of ad-
mitting that the goals, achievements, and—more broadly—narratives that
shape our lives as a whole are important determinants of their quality.
Indeed, given the substantial intuitive significance of a life’s shape, I’m
tempted to claim that the most significant element of the quality of a life
is its narrative structure. Whether I’m right about this or not, the point
still stands—we don’t learn anything from SLH about the value of a life’s
temporal structure. Instead, we learn something much more interesting.
We learn what makes a life good whatever its shape.This content downloaded from 129.237.046.099 on December 02, 2016 11:27:51 AM
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